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ABSTRACT:  
Purpose: This purpose of this study is to examine the asymmetric adjustment effects for the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) for South Africa against her main currency trading partners; 
namely, the US, the UK, the Euro area, China and Japan. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: This study presents a two-fold empirical approach by using 
nominal exchange rate and aggregate price level data collected monthly for the periods 1971-
2013. As a first step, the paper tests for nonlinear integration properties on the real exchange 
rate as computed as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for price differentials between the 
domestic and foreign price levels. The paper then proceeds to investigate asymmetric 
cointegration and error correction effects between nominal exchange rates and aggregate 
price differentials; and further supplements the empirical analysis by investigating granger 
causal effects between the variables.  
Findings: While the study is able to validate significant asymmetric PPP effects between 
South Africa and all her main currency exchange partners through the application of 
asymmetric unit root tests; the evidence presented when examining these PPP effects through 
the use of threshold cointegration and error correction analysis exempts the relationship 
explored between South African and the Euro area. Furthermore, the causal effects are found 
to run uni-directional from exchange rates to aggregate price differentials for all significant 
asymmetric cointegration relations. 
Originality/value: This study makes a novel contribution to literature by confirm significant 
asymmetric PPP effects between South Africa and her main currency exchange partners from 
both a unit root and a co-integration perspective.  
Keywords: Purchasing power parity (PPP), Threshold co-integration, Threshold unit root 
tests, South Africa. 
JEL Classification Code: B22, C32, E31, E58, F31. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Up to date, the purchasing power parity (PPP) represents one of the oldest and yet 
remains one of the most controversial doctrines existing within the economic paradigm. The 
underlying notion of the PPP hypothesis presents deviations from the parity as profitable 
commodity arbitrage opportunities which, if exploited, will tend to bring the exchange rate 
towards parity (Brissimis et. al., 2005). Alternatively stated, the PPP relationship predicts a 
constant equilibrium level at which exchange rates converge, such that foreign currencies 
should possess the same purchasing power and, consequentially, any change in the exchange 
rate between two countries‟ currencies is determined by the relative price ratio between the 
domestic and foreign countries (Azail et. al., 2001). Historically, the intellectual origins of the 
PPP theory has been unanimously attributed to the early pioneering work of Cassel (1916) 
although some commentators highlight that the theory may have emerged as early as the 15
th
 
century when Spanish theologian Domingo Banez (1527-1604) and other Salamanca scholars 
argued that currencies exchange at a parity allowing for the same purchase of the same basket 
between two economies. Regardless of the true origins of the theory, the empirical validity of 
the PPP hypothesis, nevertheless, bears important financial implications from an empirical, a 
theoretical as well as policy perspectives. 
 
From an empirical standpoint, the PPP hypothesis requires a real exchange rate to 
either evolve constantly over time or at least exhibit mean reverting behaviour with no 
stochastic trend (Bozoklu and Kutlu, 2012) and based upon the existing literature, there are 
three key motivations as to why the empirical validity of the PPP hypothesis plays an 
important role in the academic paradigm. Firstly, since the theory of PPP is viewed as a 
theory of exchange rate determination, then stationarity of the real effective exchange rate is 
quite essential; since a real exchange rate which is characterized by a unit root implies that 
innovations to the real exchange rate are highly persistent and the time series can fluctuate 
without bound (Cashin et. al., 2004). Secondly, given that much of the open or external 
macroeconomy policy is based on the PPP hypothesis, failure to uphold a stationary real 
exchange rate series will offer a reason to put into question open economy macroeconomic 
theory (Narayan, 2005). Thirdly, stationarity of the real exchange rate has implications for 
practical purposes since estimates of the PPP are frequently used in determining the degree of 
misalignment of the nominal exchange rate; the appropriate policy response to detected 
misalignments in the exchange rate; the setting of exchange parities, and international 
comparison of national income levels (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). In this regard, the PPP 
hypothesis is viewed as a suitable prediction model which allows policymakers to discern as 
to whether or not their exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued (Narayan et. al., 2009). 
 
The empirical confirmation of the PPP hypothesis, in turn, bears a number of 
important implications towards practical policy analysis. For instance, Rogoff (1996) notes 
that the degree of persistence in the real exchange rate can be used to infer the principal 
impulses driving exchange rate movements. Furthermore, Bararumshah et. al. (2010) argue 
that since the real exchange rate is frequently considered as an important measure of 
international competiveness, more particularly for emerging economies where exports are a 
principal source of economic growth, monetary authorities in developing economies are 
typically concerned about large and persistent deviations from the PPP since exchange rates 
are likely to affect net exports, as well as the cost of servicing foreign-currency-denominated-
debt. In other words, the validity of PPP is of particular importance to policymakers in 
developing economies since the PPP provides an important basis for financial stability and 
structural adjustment policies which are designed to improve the external competitiveness 
and is consequentially used as a measure of economic integration (Liu and Su, 2011). The 
PPP is also viewed as a useful policy tool in determining the design of monetary policy and 
assessing whether a flexible exchange rate system is successful in insulating the domestic 
economy from foreign shocks (Frankel, 1981). Thus when the PPP hypothesis does not hold, 
the use of the monetary approach in determining the exchange rate level is invalidated as this 
approach requires that the PPP holds true (Bozoklu and Kutlu, 2012).  
 
Even though there exists an almost unanimous agreement that the PPP does not 
provide a good description of short-run exchange rate movements, no definite evidence has 
been found as to whether PPP holds in the long run (Oh, 1996). For instance, Brissimis et. al. 
(2005) argue that the failure of the PPP hypothesis to the hold in the short-run became 
obvious in the years immediately following the monetary policy shift to floating exchange 
rates as experienced by a number of Central Banks worldwide, and henceforth, the PPP 
hypothesis has been accepted as a parity condition linking relative prices and the exchange 
rate in the long-run. However, even in attempting to model long-run movements in real 
exchange rates, such attempts by researchers have typically been met with mixed results, 
more prominently for developing economies as has been demonstrated in a recent publication 
by Liu et. al. (2011). Therefore, the examination of nonlinear adjustment toward long-run 
PPP has emerged as an attractive alternative and this empirical view is highly justified on a 
number of theoretical grounds. Take for instance, Nakagawa (2010) who argue that 
nonlinearity may arise in the presence of the transactions costs that preclude goods-market 
arbitrage; and only when the price differentials become large enough to outweigh the costs, 
will arbitrage operate to eliminate deviations from PPP. Other theoretical justifications have 
been presented by Bozoklu and Kutlu (2012) who put forth claims that the disparity of price 
indices, the existence of non-tradable goods, trade barriers and imperfect competitive market 
structures also contribute towards invalidating the assumption of a linear PPP hypothesis in 
the long-run. Furthermore, Holmes and Wang (2006) attribute asymmetric behaviour in 
exchange rates to the reluctancy commonly shown by Central Banks in facilitating 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in a regime of managed floating as well as to 
heterogeneity of participants in the foreign exchange market in terms of agents expectations 
formation or investors objectives. 
 
In screening through the former evidence as presented in previous case studies, one is 
able to observe that there generally exist two strands of literature which empirically examine 
the significance of asymmetries in the PPP relationship. The first strand of these studies 
examines the asymmetries in the PPP hypothesis by examining the integration properties of a 
series of real exchange rates through the use of asymmetric unit root tests (Kim and Moh, 
2010; Yoon, 2010; Su et. al., 2011). The second strand of studies applies asymmetric co-
integration techniques in examining the correlation between real exchange rates and 
differences in the price indices (Baum et. al. 2001; Holmes and Wang, 2006; Nakagawa, 
2010). Generally, research academics have, for a variety of justified empirical or 
methodological rationale, preferred one approach over the other but rarely do economists opt 
to examine or use both approaches simultaneously, let alone from an asymmetric perspective. 
Our study therefore contributes to the existing literature by applying both asymmetric unit 
root tests and threshold co-integration analysis to the PPP hypothesis for the South African 
economy relative to her trading currency partners namely; the United States (US); the United 
Kingdom (UK); the Euro area; China and Japan between the period of 1998 and 2013. This 
can be considered a worthwhile contribution to the academic literature since such an 
empirical exercise, to the best of our current knowledge, has not been conducted for South 
Africa relative to her main trading currency partners. Besides, the current literature provides 
no empirical attempts which test for the causal effects in the PPP relationship for South 
African data relative to her trading currency partners of which our study conveniently 
accounts for. 
 Having provided an introduction and motivation for this current study; the remainder 
of the paper is outlined as follows. Section two provides an outline of how to test the PPP 
hypothesis using asymmetric unit root tests of Kapetanois and Shin (2006). Section three of 
the paper presents an outline of the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) and 
threshold error correction (TEC) model of Enders and Silkos (1998) used to examine 
threshold co-integration effects in the PPP hypothesis. Section four presents the time series 
data used in the study as well as the empirical analysis as performed on the utilized data. 
Section five of the paper concludes with policy implications of the results obtained. 
 
2 PPP AND UNIT ROOT TESTS 
According to Darby (1980), Haikko (1992) and Taylor and Taylor (2004) there are 
two distinct concepts under which the PPP hypothesis might hold. Firstly, there is the 
absolute version of the PPP hypothesis which strictly adheres to the “law of one price” within 
an integrated and competitive market; and assumes homogeneity and substitutability of the 
goods with no transaction costs, tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers (Kargbo, 2004). The 
absolute PPP theory can also be viewed as an extension of the quantity theory of money to an 
international economy, in which an increase in the supply of money leads to a simultaneous 
increase in the price level and a decline in the exchange rate (Haikko, 1992). Empirically, the 
absolute version of the PPP hypothesis typically assumes the following functional form: 
 
𝒫𝑡
𝑑 = є𝑡𝒫𝑡
𝑓
           (1) 
 
Where є𝑡  is the nominal exchange rate, which is commonly defined as the unit price 
of foreign currency in terms of home currency; and 𝒫𝑡
𝑑  and 𝒫𝑡
𝑓
 are the local and foreign price 
levels, respectively. Despite its simplicity and considerable appeal as theory of equilibrium 
exchange rates, however, in practice the absolute version of the PPP hypothesis has generally 
failed on the account of three fundamental reasons. Firstly, the absolute PPP theory 
seemingly holds only when the purchasing power of a unit for currency is exactly equal in the 
domestic economy and the foreign economy, once it is converted into foreign currency at the 
market exchange rate (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). In other words, the absolute theory is 
strictly dependent upon the law of one price, which has been proved not to hold – even on 
average (McChesney et.al., 2004). Secondly, price levels in different countries are computed 
using imperfect price indexes and, as a result, the simple ratio of the price levels may not be 
an adequate measure of the equilibrium exchange rates (Haikko, 1992). Thirdly, deviations 
from absolute PPP may occur on account of transport costs, tariffs and differential speeds of 
adjustments in the goods and foreign exchange markets, of which the absolute PPP 
hypothesis does not take into consideration these irregularities (Shirley, 2013).  
 
Due to the preceding arguments, most economists and research academics have 
almost exclusively turned to their attention towards the use of the second version of the PPP 
hypothesis; namely, the weak or relative version of the PPP hypothesis. Generally, the 
relative version of the PPP hypothesis is favoured as a more effective measure of the 
equilibrium exchange rate since it follows directly from the absolute PPP, such that the 
relative PPP unconditional holds when the absolute PPP holds, and yet may also hold when 
the absolute PPP fails to hold. Pragmatically, the weak or relative version of the PPP 
hypothesis casts the theory in terms of changes in relative prices and the exchange rates 
(Kargbo, 2006) and consequentially, researchers commonly opt to use a logarithmic version 
of the PPP hypothesis as specified below: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝒫𝑡
𝑑 − 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝒫𝑡
𝑓
+ µ𝑡       (2) 
 
Due to transaction costs and other impediments caused by trade restrictions, research 
academics commonly relax the homogeneity restrictions (i.e. 𝛼 = 0) as well as the symmetry 
and proportionality restrictions (i.e. 𝛽1 = −𝛽2 and 𝛽1 = −𝛽2 = 1, respectively). By further 
defining  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝒫𝑡
𝑑 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝒫𝑡
𝑓
, one can re-specify equation (2) as a restricted form of 
the relative version of the PPP hypothesis as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗ + µ𝑡         (3) 
 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2006) note that under a floating exchange rate system, 
as adopted by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), a country‟s currency could 
depreciate against one currency and appreciate against another and thus rendering it more 
feasible to use the real effective exchange rate in examining unit roots in the exchange rate of 
any given economy. Consequentially, researchers typically extend equation (2) to incorporate 
the real exchange rate in determining the equilibrium level of exchange rates and as a result, 
rely on the real exchange rate, as opposed to the nominal exchange rate, in validating the PPP 
hypothesis under the implementation of specified unit root tests. By definition, the real 
exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate (i.e. domestic price of foreign currency) 
multiplied by the ratio of national prices (i.e. domestic price level divided by foreign price 
level); and thus provides a measure of the purchasing power of a unit of foreign currency in 
the foreign currency relative to the purchasing power of an equivalent unit of domestic 
currency in the domestic economy (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). By denoting 𝜏𝑡  as the real 
exchange rate, we can substitute the real exchange rate formulae (i.e. 
є𝑡
𝜏𝑡
=
𝒫𝑡
𝑑
𝒫𝑡
𝑓) into equation (2) and by re-arranging the terms and further converting the variables 
into logarithmic form, we can obtain the following PPP regression equation: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜏𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗        (4) 
 
From the equation (4), the real exchange rate, 𝜏𝑡 , may be, for convenience sake, 
interpreted as a measure of deviation from PPP equilibrium. In order to validate the PPP 
hypothesis, one can test whether the real exchange rate is stationary. In testing for 
stationarity, the real exchange rate can be placed subject to the following generalized 
autoregressive (Dickey-Fuller-type) regression: 
 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝜙𝜏𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑡          (5) 
 
Where 𝜙 is the least square estimate and 𝜉𝑡 is the associated normally distributed error 
term. For the PPP hypothesis to be valid, the stationary hypothesis of │𝜙│ < 1 should not be 
capable of being rejected such that the real exchange rate time series can be modelled as a 
mean reverting autoregressive process and deviations from the PPP are temporary. Earlier 
studies that sought to test for stationary of the real exchange rates mostly relied on standard 
unit root tests such as the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests and provided little support 
for the PPP hypothesis (Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan, 2006). One reason why this may have 
occurred is that if data generating process is indeed nonlinear, then linear unit root tests will 
have very low power to reject a false null hypothesis of a unit root and as a means of 
circumventing this problem, the observed time series variables may require to be tested for 
unit roots using nonlinear unit root tests. For instance, Taylor (2001) and Bec et. al. (2004) 
apply nonlinear unit root test to two-regime self exciting threshold autoregressive (SETAR) 
models for European exchange rates and demonstrate that even though consistent, the 
standard Dickey-Fuller test lacks power against nonlinear stationary alternatives when the 
data generating process of exchange rates is indeed nonlinear. Bec et. al. (2004) reach similar 
conclusions to Taylor (2001) for European exchange rates but opt to apply nonlinear unit root 
testing procedures under a three-regime SETAR model framework. Kapetanois and Shin 
(2006) extend on the aforementioned empirical framework by imposing a theoretically 
congruent condition of the corridor or middle regime of a 3-regime SETAR model as being 
characterized by an „inaction band‟ and thus propose the test procedure for the joint 
significance of all autoregressive parameters in both inner and outer regimes. In investigating 
the integration properties of the observed time series, our study follows that of Kapetanois 
and Shin (2006) by focusing on developing unit root tests based on following nonlinear 
auxiliary SETAR model: 
 
∆𝑌 = 𝑋 𝛾 𝜙 + ѵ         (6) 
 
Where: 
 
𝜙 = (𝜙1,𝜙2)
′ ;   𝛥𝑌 =  
𝛥𝜏1
𝛥𝜏2
⋮
𝛥𝜏𝑇
 ;  𝑋(𝜏) =  
𝜏0(𝛾1) 𝜏0(𝛾2)
𝜏1(𝛾1) 𝜏1(𝛾2)
⋮ ⋮
𝜏𝑇−1(𝛾1) 𝜏𝑇−1(𝛾2)
 ; and  ѵ =  
𝜉1
𝜉2
⋮
𝜉𝑇
  
 
The threshold functions for the first and last regimes (third regimes) are given by 
𝛾1 = 𝐼.  є𝑖 ≤ 𝛾1  and 𝛾2 = 𝐼.  є𝑖 > 𝛾2 , respectively; with 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 denoting the first and 
second threshold estimates, respectively. From the aforementioned, the joint null hypothesis 
of a linear unit root (i.e. 𝐻0:𝜙1 = 𝜙2 = 0) can be tested against the alternative of a three 
regime stationary process with a unit root process existing in the middle regime 
(i.e. 𝐻1:𝜙1 ,𝜙2 < 0) and these hypotheses can be tested using a standard Wald statistic 
computed as: 𝒲𝛾1,𝛾2 = 𝜙
 ′[𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜙 )]−1𝜙  where 𝜙  is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate 
of 𝜙. However, given that the threshold parameters are unknown a prior, Kapetanois and Shin 
(2006) consider three commonly used summary statistics based on the supremum (i.e. 𝒲𝑠𝑢𝑝 ), 
average (i.e. 𝒲𝑎𝑣𝑒 ) and exponential average (i.e. 𝒲𝑒𝑥𝑝 ) variations of the Wald statistic. The 
optimal values of the threshold estimates,  𝛾1 and 𝛾2, are obtained by maximizing the Wald 
statistics over a search grid and then constructing summary statistics for the obtained 
threshold estimates. In the spirit of Kapetanois and Shin (2006), we employ the 
aforementioned nonlinear unit root testing procedure to three empirical cases, namely; (i) the 
case of a zero mean process; (ii) the case of a process containing a non-zero mean; and (iii) 
the case of a process containing both non-zero mean and linear trend. The associated 
asymptotic distributions are therefore computed using a de-meaned and the de-trended 
standard Brownian motion in the construction of the associated Wald test statistic.  
 
3 PPP AND CO-INTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
The equilibrium relationship captured by the absolute version of the PPP (as an 
aggregate interpretation of the law of one price) assumes that perfect commodity arbitrage 
acts an error correction mechanism to force the Rand price of a consumption bundle of South 
African goods in line with the Rand price of a common bundle of foreign goods. Since a 
cointegrated system allows individual time series to be integrated of order one, but requires a 
linear combination of the series to be stationary, PPP is testable using the theory of co-
integration processes (Corbae and Ouliaris, 1988). Thus from a co-integration perspective, 
the PPP doctrine suggests that nominal exchange rates should be determined according to the 
differences between foreign and domestic exchanges rates of inflation (Ozdemir, 2008). In 
this regard, a number of empirical studies are concerned with testing the PPP by examining 
whether nominal exchange rates, є𝑡 , and the differences between domestic and foreign price 
levels, 𝜋𝑡
∗ are cointegrated, that is, whether these time series variables move together over 
time. This can be empirically achieved by re-arranging equation (3), to resemble the Engle-
Granger co-integration theorem for the PPP hypothesis which can be expressed as follows: 
 
µ𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗         (7) 
 
From regression (7), non-spurious co-integration effects or validity of the PPP 
hypothesis is assumed to exist under the integration conditions 𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡~I(1), 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗~I(1) and 
µ𝑡~I(0); such that the nominal exchange rates and the differences in price indexes should 
increase monotonically over time with µ𝑡  being the stationary equilibrium error of the co-
integration relation. Therefore, the standard Engle-Granger procedure for ensuring co-
integration between a pair of time series variables involves testing as to whether the 
equilibrium error, µ𝑡 , is a mean reverting process. However, as previously mentioned, the 
relation between exchange rates and national price levels can, in reality, be affected by 
several factors including transport and information costs, imperfect competition, 
technological changes, factor supplies trade restrictions and non-traded goods and services. 
Kargbo (2003) also argues that changes in the monetary policy regimes as well as financial 
liberalization and losing of restrictions on capital inflows over the last two decades or so may 
be further account/subside for rationally assuming nonlinearity in adjustment equilibrium 
process between aggregate prices and exchanges. Empirically, Cheung and Lai (1993) 
propose that the imposition of symmetry and proportionality conditions in analysing the PPP 
co-integration relationship can cause the restricted models to ignore possible interactions in 
the determination of exchange rates prices that are permitted in the unrestricted model. 
Furthermore, a number of econometricians such as Blake and Fomby (1997), Hansen and Seo 
(2002) and Seo (2006) have all demonstrated that the linear co-integration tests fall under an 
asymmetric adjustment processes and therefore it is possible that linear adjustment leads to 
poor results of the equilibrium relationship because conventional co-integration tests do not 
take into account asymmetric equilibrium adjustment. All-in-all, the aforementioned 
arguments depict that models of exchange rate determination may depict fundamental 
differences in speeds of adjustment between exchange rates and price levels. Therefore, in 
line with Enders and Silkos (2001), we deviate from the assumption of linear co-integration 
and model the equilibrium error term as the follows: 
 
𝛥µ𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡𝜌1𝜉𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝜌2𝜉𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖 + ɛ𝑡                                                      (8) 
 
And thereafter apply the following co-integration tests for (i) stationarity of the 
equilibrium error term (i.e. 𝐻0
(1)
∶ 𝜌1, 𝜌2 < 0) (ii) normal co-integration effects (i.e. 𝐻0
(2)
∶
 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0); and (iii) asymmetric co-integration effects (i.e. 𝐻0
(3)
∶ 𝜌1 = 𝜌2). The threshold 
co-integration regression as specified in equation (12), can assume two primary functional 
forms. The first is a standard threshold autoregressive (TAR) form which is dictated by the 
following indicator functions for a zero threshold level and a consistent threshold estimate (c-
TAR) specifications which are respectively denoted as: 
 
.𝑡 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
≥ 0
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 0
    .𝑡 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
≥ 𝑞
0, 𝑖𝑓
𝑡−1
< 𝑞
     (9) 
 
The second function form for the threshold regression is given by a momentum 
threshold autoregressive model (MTAR) which differs from the standard TAR specifications 
since it captures large and smooth changes or capture spiky adjustments in the co-integration 
equilibrium relationship in a series whereas the TAR model is designed to whereas the TAR 
model is limited to capturing the depth of movements in the equilibrium residuals. The 
indicator functions for the MTAR with a zero threshold and the MTAR model with a 
consistent threshold estimate (c-MTAR) are respectively specified as: 
 
𝑀.𝑡 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓𝛥
𝑡−1
≥ 0
0, 𝑖𝑓𝛥
𝑡−1
< 0
   𝑀.𝑡 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓𝛥
𝑡−1
≥ 𝑞
0, 𝑖𝑓𝛥
𝑡−1
< 𝑞
    (10) 
 
Since the threshold variable under the c-TAR and c-MTAR models, are unknown a 
prior, the threshold co-integration regression (12) is estimated by ordering the threshold 
variable, 𝑞, in ascending order such that 𝑞0 <  𝑞1 < ⋯ < 𝑞𝑇  ,where T is the number of 
observations used after truncating the upper and lower 15 percent of the observations. In 
accordance with Hansen (2000), the true threshold estimates is one which minimizes the 
residual sum of squares of the estimated regression equations. 
  
According to the granger representation theorem, an error correction model can be 
estimated once a pair of time series variables is found to be cointegrated. When the presence 
of threshold co-integration is validated, the error correction model can be modified to take 
into account asymmetries as is demonstrated in Blake and Fombly (1997) and Enders and 
Silkos (2001). The asymmetric error-correction model also can exist between a pair of time 
series variables of 𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡  and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗ when they are formed in an asymmetric co-integration 
relationship. The TAR-VEC model can be expressed as: 
 
∆є𝑡 = 11𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 12 1 − 𝐼𝑡 𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑖1∆є𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜓𝑖1∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ ѵ𝑡1               (11) 
 
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 21𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 22 1 − 𝐼𝑡 𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑖2∆є𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜓𝑖2∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ ѵ𝑡2              (12) 
 
Whereas the MTAR-TEC model is specified as: 
 
∆є𝑡 = 11𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 12 1 −𝑀𝑡 𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑖1∆є𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜓𝑖1∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ ѵ𝑡1           (13) 
 
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 21𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 22 1 −𝑀𝑡 𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑖2∆є𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜓𝑖2∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ ѵ𝑡2          (14) 
 
And the indicator functions as given in regressions (9) and (10) are respectively 
applied for the TAR-TEC and MTAR-TEC specifications. Through the above described 
systems of error correction models, the presence of asymmetries between the variables could 
initially be examined by examining the signs on the coefficients of the error correction terms; 
whereas granger causality tests can be implemented by using a standard F-test to examine 
whether the regression coefficients from the error correction models are significantly 
different from zero. Pragmatically, the null hypothesis of no error correction mechanism can 
be tested as: 𝐻0
(4)
: +
𝑡−1
+ = −
𝑡−1
−
; Whereas, the null hypothesis that the price differentials 
do not lead to nominal exchange rate is tested as: 𝐻0
(5)
:𝛼𝑘 = 0;  𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑘 and the null 
hypothesis that the nominal exchange rate does not lead to changes in price differentials do 
not lead to nominal exchange rate is tested as: 𝐻0
(6)
:𝛽𝑘  = 0;  𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 DATA DESCRIPTION  
Our data set comprises of a total of 190 monthly observations collected between the 
periods of January 1998 to October 2013. For empirical purposes, it would have been more 
desirable to employ a longer span of data, but due to data availability constraints, consistent 
monthly data could only be collected (is restricted) from the period of 1998 onwards. The 
data used in our empirical analysis comprises of the time series variables of the nominal 
foreign exchange rate and price indices for South Africa and her main exchange currency 
partners. In particular, the collected price series are based on the total consumer price index 
(CPI) for South Africa, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), the Euro area and 
China. Similarly, the nominal exchange rates are based on the nominal value of the Rand 
against the currencies of her main exchange partners namely against the US dollar (i.e. 
𝜏𝑡/𝑢𝑠$); the British pound (i.e. 𝜏𝑡/𝑢𝑘£ ), the Euro (i.e. 𝜏𝑡/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜€), the Chinese Renminbi 
(i.e. 𝜏𝑡/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎¥) and the Japanese Yen (i.e.𝜏𝑡/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛¥). As a point of convenience as well as 
consistency, all price indices are collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database whereas the remainder of the data (i.e. the 
nominal exchange rates) is collected from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database. 
Finally, in line with Frankel and Rose (1996) as well as Akinboade and Makina (2006), we 
construct the domestic-based real exchange rate against all the other currency partners, using 
the relative form of the PPP hypothesis as previously specified in regression equation (4) (i.e. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜏𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔є𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡
∗).  Furthermore, all utilized data is transformed into logarithmic 
form a prior. 
 
A perfunctory observation of the utilized data reveals a number of noteworthy stylized 
facts which would provide preliminary motivation for the use of asymmetric econometric 
techniques in analysing the PPP relationship between South Africa and her main currency 
trading partners. Firstly, we note that our data collection begins during an era in which most 
Central Banks worldwide experienced significant shifts in their conduct of monetary policy. 
Most notable of these monetary policy shifts are the adoption of an official inflation targeting 
regime as pursued by the SARB in 2002; independence of monetary policy in the UK in 
1998; the Bank of Japan‟s adoption of a zero interest rate policy in 1998; and China‟s shift to 
a more “prudent” monetary policy in 2011. These are considered as important perfunctory 
observations since these shifts in policy conduct may further motivate the need to account for 
asymmetries in the empirical analysis of PPP behaviour between South Africa and her main 
currency exchange partners. Secondly, seeing that the empirical dataset consists of the 
nominal exchange rates and price level indices; this implies that these time series variables 
“...incorporate prices of non-traded goods; it is unlikely that their use in an empirical test 
would produce symmetry and proportionality...” (Macdonald, 1995).   
 
4.2 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Having put our data collection and formation into perspective; attention can now be 
turned towards examining the integration properties of the individual time series under 
observation. Even though the sole verification of stationarity in the real exchange rate is 
necessary in directly assessing the validity of the PPP hypothesis, we also extend our unit 
root tests towards the nominal exchange rates and the differences in the price indices as a 
preliminary step towards the co-integration analysis. As previously mentioned we perform 
the unit root tests with a zero-mean process, with an intercept and also with a trend and an 
intercept. We select the number of lags of the unit root tests based on the general-to-specific 
rule and decide on the optimal lag length as the system which produces the lowest Alkaike 
information criterion (AIC) decision rule. Table 1 below present the results of the Kapetanois 
and Shin (2006) unit root tests as employed on the time series variables.  
 
Table 1: Kapetanois and Shin (2006) Unit Test Results 
 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑡𝑕𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
𝒲𝑠𝑢𝑝   𝒲𝑎𝑣𝑒   𝒲𝑒𝑥𝑝    
𝛾1 
 
𝛾2  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  
𝜏𝑡/𝑢𝑠$ 17.07 12.87 6.39  4.25 5.44 4.98  128.60 63.74 14.64  794.9 917.2 
𝜏𝑡/𝑢𝑘£ 7.63 8.94 16.73  3.56 4.11 5.47  11.87 13.91 386.98  794.9 917.2 
𝜏𝑡/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜€ 12.47 12.81 13.22  6.40 8.89 8.93  77.93 191.50 208.81  1065 1215 
𝜏𝑡/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎¥ 15.68 16.18 21.63  6.24 6.74 7.06  89.74 93.31 2364.29  111.9 137.6 
𝜏𝑡/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛¥ 7.13 18.88 25.26  2.63 4.33 2.50  7.73 278.68 3259.77  8.00 8.80 
               
є𝑡/𝑢𝑠$ 17.08 12.88 6.39  4.26 5.44 4.98  128.94 63.97 14.65  795.1 917.5 
є𝑡/𝑢𝑘£ 14.64 8.95 16.74  4.48 4.11 5.47  59.48 13.21 388.47  795.1 917.5 
є𝑡/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜€ 12.47 12.82 13.24  6.40 8.90 8.94  36.34 192.80 210.06  1065 1215 
є𝑡/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎¥ 15.57 16.06 21.54  6.24 6.73 7.05  88.28 91.08 2322.80  112.2 128.7 
є𝑡/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛¥ 8.19 21.48 24.56  3.32 5.01 2.48  13.08 674.18 2323.79  8.44 9.80 
               
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑠 10.45 8.73 12.14  4.15 7.94 5.97  22.53 54.27 68.51  0.1958 0.2339 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑘 14.63 10.85 14.11  4.47 7.07 8.30  59.04 82.93 152.57  0.1869 0.2008 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 10.24 15.16 14.22  6.18 3.88 8.53  36.38 332.01 482.83  0.2094 0.3031 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎 7.24 12.02 13.89  3.23 6.91 11.29  9.47 93.56 450.68  0.3220 0.3455 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛 7.82 10.11 25.26  1.70 5.52 2.50  7.08 48.29 3259.77  0.2875 0.3484 
 
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 
10% 6.01 7.29 10.35  6.01 7.29 10.35  7.49 38.28 176.80    
5% 7.49 9.04 12.16  7.49 9.04 12.16  20.18 91.83 437.03    
1% 10.49 12.64 16.28  10.49 12.64 16.28  237.46 555.57 3428.92    
Significance Level Codes:”***”, “**‟ and „*‟ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Critical values at 10 percent 
significance level:  
 
In referring to the results reported in Table 1, we are able to reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root in favour of a stationary three-regime TAR process for all observed time series 
when the unit root test is performed using the supremum and the exponential average on the 
Wald statistics. The evidence is less conclusive when the average on the Wald statistic is used 
to evaluate the integration properties of the time series variables. Generally these results 
provide us with preliminary evidence of PPP behaviour between South Africa and her main 
trading partners. One of the most interesting or noteworthy aspects of the results reported in 
Table 1, concerns the threshold estimates which determine the rand value at which the real 
exchange rate is found to be stationary. Take for instance, the finding of the PPP hypothesis 
being found to valid only when the computed real effective exchange rate between the rand 
the US dollar as well as the British pound lies outside the range of $1=R7.95 and $1=R9.17 
for the dollar and between £1=R7.95 and £1=R9.17 for the pound. Similar inferences can be 
drawn for the Euro, the Chinese Renminbi and the Japanese Yen with stationary processes 
being found outside the real exchange rates of €1=R10.65 and €1=R12.15 for the Euro; 
outside the range of ¥1=R1.12 and ¥1=R1.38 for the Renminbi and a much narrower outer 
band range of ¥1=R0.80 and ¥1=R0.88 for the Yen.  
 
One noteworthy advantage of the performed unit root tests is that they render the time 
series variables as a regime-switching function of both a unit root process as well as a 
stationary process. This is important in our empirical analysis, since, on one hand, this can 
render the stationary portion of the real exchange rates as being in complete compliance with 
the PPP hypothesis, and on the other hand, it renders the unit root portion of the nominal 
exchange rate and the differences in the consumer price indices as providing preliminary 
evidence of PPP cointegration. As is demonstrated in table 1, the results indicate a partial unit 
root process for the nominal exchange rates and the differences in price indices between 
South Africa and all her main trading partners. Therefore, the performed unit root tests 
provide two separate and yet simultaneous evidences of PPP behaviour between South Africa 
and her main trading partners. Firstly, the partial stationarity found in the computed real 
exchange rates provides our primary validity of the PPP hypothesis. Secondly, the partial unit 
root process found between the nominal exchange rate variable and the differences in the 
price indices presents a second indication or conformity of PPP hypothesis. However, with 
regards to the latter case, the evidence presented is merely preliminary and formal 
cointegration analysis must be conducted in order to avoid spurious results being associated 
with any estimated PPP regressions. The paper therefore proceeds to perform formal 
asymmetric cointegration and threshold error correction analysis between South African 
nominal exchange rates, on one hand, and the differences in domestic and foreign aggregate 
prices, on the other hand.  
  
4.3 CO-INTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
Having established that nominal exchange rates and differences in price levels can be 
partially rendered as being integrated of order one (i.e. I(1)), the paper proceeds to implement 
the asymmetric co-integration model of Enders and Silkos (2001), as discussed in the 
previous section of the paper. Prior to estimating the threshold co-integration and error 
correction models, we apply a battery of co-integration and error correction tests to the PPP 
threshold co-integration regressions between nominal exchange rates and the differences in 
domestic and foreign aggregate prices. As previously mentioned, we apply four generic 
cointegration tests to the regressions, namely; (1) tests for the stationarity of the co-
integration residuals (2) tests for non-spurious co-integration effects (3) tests for asymmetric 
co-integration effects; and (4) tests for asymmetric error correction mechanisms. In taking a 
systematic approach to reporting the results, as presented in Table 2; the upper half of Table 2 
presents the hypotheses tests on both the TAR and MTAR models with a zero thresholds 
whereas the bottom half of Table 2 examines these hypotheses on the TAR and MTAR 
specifications with consistent threshold estimates. 
 
Table 2: Co-integration and error correction tests for TAR and c-TAR models 
 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 
(𝑐)𝑇𝐴𝑅  (𝑐)𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 
 Y X 𝐻0
(1)
 𝐻0
(2)
 𝐻0
(3)
 𝐻0
(4)
  𝐻0
(1)
 𝐻0
(2)
 𝐻0
(3)
 𝐻0
(4)
 
 
 
 
𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 
𝑡𝑕𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑 
є𝑡/𝑢𝑠$ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.30 
(0.01)∗ 
1.71 
(0.19)  
2.23 
(0.13)∗ 
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.62 
(0.01)∗ 
2.31 
(0.13)  
3.11 
(0.08)∗ 
є𝑡/𝑢𝑘£ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
3.72 
(0.03)∗ 
0.41 
(0.52)  
2.70 
(0.10)∗ 
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.36 
(0.01)∗ 
1.65 
(0.20)  
1.76 
(0.19)  
є𝑡/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜€ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.02 
(0.02)∗ 
0.11 
(0.74)  
4.61 
(0.03)∗∗ 
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
3.98 
(0.02)∗ 
0.03 
(0.85)  
0.01 
(0.92)  
є𝑡/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎¥ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
2.36 
(0.10)∗ 
0.11 
(0.74)  
0.03 
(0.86)  
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.23 
(0.01)∗∗ 
5.71 
(0.02)∗ 
4.42 
(0.04)∗∗ 
є𝑡/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛¥ 
 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.06 
(0.02)∗ 
0.29 
(0.59)  
1.03 
(0.31)  
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.36 
(0.01)∗∗ 
2.79 
(0.10)∗ 
2.16 
(0.14)∗ 
  
 
 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑡𝑕𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑑 
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 
є𝑡/𝑢𝑠$ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.67 
(0.00)∗∗ 
4.35 
(0.04)∗ 
4.32 
(0.04)∗∗ 
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
6.02 
(0.00)∗∗ 
5.01 
(0.03)∗ 
4.51 
(0.04)∗∗ 
є𝑡/𝑢𝑘£ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑢𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.13 
(0.02)∗ 
1.21 
(0.27)  
1.25 
(0.27)  
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.62 
(0.00)∗∗ 
4.08 
(0.05)∗ 
4.55 
(0.03)∗∗ 
є𝑡/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜€ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.16 
(0.02)∗ 
0.39 
(0.53)  
3.67 
(0.06)∗ 
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.09 
(0.01)∗∗ 
2.16 
(0.14)  
2.60 
(0.11)∗ 
є𝑡/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎¥ 𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
2.48 
(0.09)∗ 
0.34 
(0.56)  
0.29 
(0.59)  
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
5.79 
(0.00)∗∗ 
6.80 
(0.01)∗∗ 
5.62 
(0.02)∗∗ 
є𝑡/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛¥ 
 
𝜋𝑡
∗/𝑗𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑛 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
4.43 
(0.01)∗ 
1.01 
(0.32)  
2.02 
(0.16)  
 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 
7.54 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
6.98 
(0.01)∗∗ 
6.84 
(0.01)∗∗∗ 
Significance Level Codes:”***”, “**‟ and „*‟ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The p-statistics are reported in 
(). 
 
In also undertaking a systematic approach to reporting the results presented in Table 
2; we can firstly note that the null hypothesis of stationarity in the co-integration residual 
cannot be rejected for all PPP threshold co-integration residuals. Secondly, we also note that 
all regressions significantly manage to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration effects 
between nominal exchange rates and the differences in domestic and foreign aggregate prices 
for all threshold regression specifications. This result is of particular importance because it 
indicates there is a significant PPP relationship between South Africa and her main currency 
trading partners. Thirdly, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric co-
integration between the variables for all model specifications. However, we find that for the 
threshold co-integration relationship between South Africa and each of her currency trading 
partners, we find at least one significant threshold model (for all trading partners with the sole 
exception for Euro data). For instance, for the case of South Africa‟s currency relationship 
with the US, we are unable to find threshold cointegration using the TAR and MTAR models 
with zero threshold estimates and, yet we find significant threshold co-integration effects 
with the c-TAR and c-MTAR models which include a consistent threshold estimate. 
Similarly, we are able to only establish significant c-MTAR threshold co-integration effects 
for the UK whereas for both China and Japan we find significant MTAR and c-MTAR 
threshold effects for the observed data. Lastly, we find that for each of the established 
threshold co-integration models, we are able to establish significant threshold error correction 
effects.  
 
Based on the results reported in Table 2 we observe a number interesting 
phenomenon. In particular, we observe that for all threshold cointegration regressions there 
exists a smooth (as indicated by a MTAR model) as opposed to an abrupt (as indicated by a 
TAR model) co-integration and error correction transition mechanism between South African 
nominal exchange rates and the differences in aggregate prices. An exception is noted for 
estimates on US data, in which the empirical results reveal the existence of a TAR-TEC 
regression model in addition to the MTAR-TEC specification. This implies both a smooth as 
well as an abrupt threshold cointegration between the currency exchange relations of South 
Africa and the US. Having generally established relevant and significant threshold co-
integration and error correction effects for all PPP regression specifications, we proceed to 
formally estimate the associated TAR-TEC and MTAR-TEC models for the relevant 
regressions, with the estimation results being reported below in Table 4. For each of the 
estimated regressions, we provide estimates of threshold value (where applicable), as well as 
the TAR or MTAR regressions and the associated TEC specification. 
 
Table 3: (c)TAR-TEC and (c)MTAR-TEC Model estimates 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑈𝑆 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡 = 6.58
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 0.53
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗  + 0.03𝜉𝑡−1
 0.17 
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.13 + 0.11𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.13 + 0.33
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.02
 0.01 ∗∗∗
+  
0.16
 0.08 ∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.05
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.00 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.13 
0.26
 0.21 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.02
 0.27 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.00
 0.90 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.13 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.01
(0.40)
+  
0.21
 0.78 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.26
 0.02 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.02
 0.41 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.13 
0.49
 0.78 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.52
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.11
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐 −𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡 = 6.58
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 0.53
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ − 0.02𝜉𝑡−1
 0.22 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.02 − 0.11𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.02 + 0.32
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.00 ∗
+  
0.15
 0.09 ∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.05
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.03 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.02 
0.30
 0.15 ∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.02
 0.29 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.11 ∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.02 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.01
(0.17)
+  
−0.22
 0.78 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.25
 0.02 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.02
 0.37 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.02 
0.82
 0.63 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.50
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.10
 0.00 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.02 
  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑈𝐾 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐 −𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡 = 7.10
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 0.53
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ − 0.02𝜉𝑡−1
 0.56 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 + 0.10𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 + 0.18
 0.01 ∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.01 ∗∗∗
+  
− 0.21
 0.02 ∗∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.03
 0.19 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 
0.23
 0.39 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.04
 0.12 ∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.01 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.01
(0.15)
+  
− 0.12
 0.83 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.07
 0.52 
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.00
 0.98 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 
−0.10
 0.95 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.40
 0.02 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.90
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 
  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
є𝑡 = 4.41
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 1.11
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ + 0.01𝜉𝑡−1
 0.71 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 − 0.07𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 + 0.31
 0.01 ∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.56 
+  
0.37
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ − 0.04
 0.08 ∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.00
 0.70 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 
−0.07
 0.65 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.02
 0.02 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.02
 0.00 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.01
(0.04)∗∗
+  
−0.22
 0.65 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.21
 0.06 ∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.02
 0.55 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 
0.53
 0.48 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.60
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.06
 0.01 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 
  
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐 −𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
є𝑡 = 4.41
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 1.11
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ − 0.00𝜉𝑡−1
 0.93 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 + 0.09𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 + 0.32
 0.01 ∗∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.53 
+  
0.38
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.04
 0.12 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.25 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 
−0.09
 0.58 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.02
 0.59 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.02
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.01
 0.05 ∗∗
+  
−0.21
 0.67 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.22
 0.04 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.80 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ −0.01 
0.60
 0.42 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.61
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.08
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < −0.01 
  
 
 
 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐽𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑁 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
є𝑡 = 1.91
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 0.73
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ − 0.02𝜉𝑡−1
 0.53 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 − 0.08𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 + 0.28
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+  
0.06
 0.49 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.03
 0.02 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.02
 0.57 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 
1.09
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.01
 0.81 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.03 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.00
(0.60)
+  
−0.26
 0.72 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.30
 0.01 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.02
 0.57 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0 
−1.26
 0.69 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.28
 0.12 ∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.08
 0.01 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0 
  
 
 
 
 
𝑐 −𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
є𝑡 = 1.91
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+ 0.73
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝜋𝑡
∗ + 0.01𝜉𝑡−1
 0.66 
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0.02 − 0.09𝜉𝑡−1
 0.00 ∗∗∗
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0.02 + 0.27
 0.00 ∗∗∗
∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖  
∆𝜋𝑡
∗ = 0.00
 0.00 ∗∗∗
+   
0.09
 0.29 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.03
 0.03 ∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.01
 0.10 ∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0.02 
1.03
 0.01 ∗∗∗
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.00
 0.91 
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.00
 0.03 ∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0.02 
    
∆є𝑡 = 0.00
(0.69)
+  
−0.13
 0.85 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.28
 0.01 ∗∗∗
∆є𝑡−1 + 0.20
 0.55 

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 ≥ 0.02 
−1.41
 0.64 
∆𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 0.28
 0.11 ∗
∆є𝑡−1 − 0.09
 0.00 ∗∗∗

𝑡−1
𝐼.  ∆𝜉𝑡−1 < 0.02 
  
Significance Level Codes:”***”, “**‟ and „*‟ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The associated p-values are 
reported in parentheses (). 
 
From the results reported above in Table 3, all estimated regressions indicate significant 
positive correlations between nominal exchange rates and the difference in aggregate price 
levels; which is a result consistent with the PPP theoretical hypothesis. In applying Hansen‟s 
(2000) conditional least squares (CLS) method to estimate the threshold values for the c-
TAR-TEC and c-MTAR-TEC models; we obtain values which lie in the range of between -
0.08 and 0.02. These obtained threshold values which govern the regime switching behaviour 
of the error terms can be considered very reasonable estimates since they all lie relatively 
close to a value of zero. In particular, for a threshold value close to zero, positive 
discrepancies from the long-run equilibrium are measured by the absolute value of the 
coefficient on the error term above the threshold value (i.e. ∣ 𝜌1 ∣) whereas negative 
discrepancies are measured by the absolute value of the coefficient on the error term below 
the threshold value (i.e. ∣ 𝜌2 ∣). Based on the results reported in Table 3, it is evident that the 
speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is more rapid for positive discrepancies in the case 
of South African-US and South African-UK relations whereas convergence towards the long-
run equilibrium is more rapid for negative discrepancies for the South African-China and the 
South-Africa-Japan cases. 
 
On the other hand, the estimated error correction coefficients 𝑡−1
−  and 𝑡−1
+ respectively 
provide a measure of the speed of adjustment for negative and positive deviations from the 
long-run PPP. Furthermore, deviations from the equilibrium level can only be deemed to be 
self-correcting if at least one the error correction terms in the error correction models is 
significantly negative. In particular, the negative estimate of the error correction term reveals 
the speed adjustment at which shocks to either nominal exchange rates or differences in 
aggregate prices will result in reversion back to equilibrium. In general, our results indicate 
that for all estimated regression equations, the only negative and significant error correction 
terms are found when deviations from the equilibrium are positive with the nominal exchange 
rate being the driving force in the error correction system. At this juncture it should be noted 
that these results are in coherence with those presented by Enders and Chumrusphonlert 
(2004) who, for Asian-pacific economies, find evidence of significant equilibrium reversion 
behaviour only when the error correction mechanism is being determined by the nominal 
exchange rates and the deviations are positive. However, in elaborating on the results 
presented in Table 3, we find for the South African-US case that positive nominal exchange 
rate shocks converge back to long-run equilibrium at the rate of 11 percent when the shocks 
are abrupt and at a slightly lower rate of 10 percent when shocks are smooth. The South 
African-UK case is a particularly interesting case in which we establish relative high 
equilibrium reversion rates of 90 percent when a positive nominal exchange rate shock is 
induced in the system. In the case of South Africa-China PPP relations, mean reversion 
towards equilibrium is at 6 percent when nominal exchange rate shocks are abrupt and at 8 
percent when disequilibrium is smooth whereas for the Japan-South Africa case, mean 
reversion for abrupt shocks is self-correcting at 8 percent and 9 percent for smooth shocks.  
 
Given evidence of threshold cointegration and error correction mechanisms between the 
exchange rate and differences in price levels, it would be useful to enquire as to whether 
nominal exchange rates are the endogenous or exogenous variables within the estimated 
asymmetric PPP relationships. To this end we run granger causality tests on each of estimated 
threshold cointegration and error correction models as was described in detail in the previous 
section of this paper. The results of the granger causality tests are reported in Table 4 which 
show that for all estimated equations; nominal exchange rates (i.e. є𝑡) are deemed to granger 
cause aggregate price levels (i.e. 𝜋𝑡
∗). This result is in coherence with those obtained in 
Kholdy and Sohrabian (1990) as well as Schnabl and Baur (2002). Einzig (1935) attributes 
this finding to the notion that in a system of flexible exchange rates appreciation 
(depreciation) of a country‟s currency leads to a decrease (increase) in the general price level 
because of the impact on domestic activity. Conversely, an appreciation (depreciation) 
dampens (stimulates) domestic activity, inflation is curbed (accelerated) and the central bank 
will adapt monetary policy by slowing (accelerating) monetary expansion. Another 
perspective as presented by Hafer (1989) insinuates that import prices can act as a 
transmission mechanism from the exchange rate to domestic prices. Furthermore Menon 
(1995) attributes this behaviour to exchange rates affecting domestic prices through export 
prices due to incomplete pass through and productivity adjustments. All-in-all, either of these 
can hold as a suitable explanation in providing a relevant explanation as to the causality 
results as obtained in our empirical analysis. 
 
Table 4: Granger Causality tests 
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑌 𝑋 𝐻03 𝐻04 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
       
 
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴/𝑈𝑆 
𝑐 − 𝑇𝐴𝑅 
−𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
є𝑡  𝜋𝑡
∗ 0.06 
(0.94)  
14.13 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
𝑐 − 𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅
− 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
є𝑡  𝜋𝑡
∗ 0.12 
(0.88)  
12.69 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴/𝑈𝐾 
 
 
𝑐 − 𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅
− 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡  
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 
0.04 
(0.96)  
4.51 
(0.01)∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴/𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 
 
𝑐 − 𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅
− 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡  
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 
0.27 
(0.76)  
14.39 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 
−𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡  
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 
0.33 
(0.72)  
15.18 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴/𝐽𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑁 
 
𝑐 − 𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅
− 𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡  
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 
0.22 
(0.80)  
8.48 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑅 
−𝑇𝐸𝐶 
 
 
є𝑡  
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 
0.17 
(0.84)  
7.90 
(0.00)∗∗∗ 
є𝑡  𝑡𝑜 𝜋𝑡
∗ 
Significance Level Codes:”***”, “**‟ and „*‟ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses (). 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
In view of a lack of evidence in analysing possible asymmetric behaviour in the PPP 
behaviour between South Africa and her main currency trading partners, namely the US, the 
UK, the Euro area, China and Japan; our study sought to fill this gap in the academic 
paradigm in a two-stage empirical process. In the first stage of our empirical analysis, we 
examined the integration properties of the real exchange rate as computed as the logarithmic 
transformation of the nominal exchange rates adjusted for price differentials between the 
South Africa and her trading currency partners. As a point of departure from the common 
norm of linear unit root test as standardized in the empirical literature; this study opted to 
apply the nonlinear unit root tests of Kapetanois and Shin (2006) to the empirical data. 
Empirical evidence showed significant PPP behaviour between South Africa and all her main 
trading partners, and yet the significance of such PPP behaviour is nonlinear, that is, it only 
exists outside a specified range of real exchange rates between South Africa and her main 
currency trading partners. In further applying the aforementioned unit root tests to nominal 
exchange rates and price rate differentials; partial evidence of PPP cointegration was 
preliminary established as the time series were found to partial containing a unit root process. 
 
In the second stage of our empirical analysis, formal TAR-TEC and MTAR-TEC models 
were introduced as a means of determining the extent to which nominal exchange rates and 
the differences in the domestic and foreign aggregate price levels where asymmetrically co-
integrated. To this end, the empirical results were able to confirm significant asymmetric 
cointegration evidence for all South Africa‟s currency trading partners with the sole 
exception of the Euro area. In particular, the empirical analysis depicted that negative 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are easier to eradicate within the South-African UK 
and South African-US relations whereas negative deviations from long-run equilibrium are 
found to persist longer for the South Africa-Chinese and South Africa-Japan cases. However, 
for all relations exchange rates are the primary mechanism of adjustment toward the long run 
equilibrium between South Africa and her main trading partners. Having established 
significant asymmetric cointegration relations between the various PPP relationships, we 
supplemented this evidence with granger causality tests. Contrary to popular belief, the 
granger causality tests revealed that nominal exchange rates are exogenous whereas 
aggregate prices are endogenous, that is, causality was rendered to solely run from nominal 
exchange rates to aggregate prices. 
 
In conclusion, our study confirms the importance of the PPP hypothesis for monetary policy 
conduct in South Africa by placing emphasis on the stability of exchange rates, in not only 
controlling aggregate price levels, but in also improving the competitive behaviour of 
domestic prices in international markets. In particular, the empirical analysis reveals that 
stability in aggregate price levels can be achieved through stability in exchange rate levels 
and yet price stability between South Africa and her trading partners will not affect the 
exchange rate. This result is of particular importance taking into consideration the increasing 
participation of South African Reserve Bank‟s (SARB) involvement in building up foreign 
exchange reserves as this involves the purchase foreign exchange from financial markets. In 
terms of policy implications, our results therefore depict that an exchange rate targeting 
framework may prove to be a useful avenue for future policy stabilization policies which may 
be adopted by the SARB. As a by product, the empirical results obtained in this study further 
supplement those presented by Bonga-Bonga and Kabundi (2010); Phiri (2012) and Gupta 
(2013) in advocating for the use of a flexible exchange rate targeting frameworks as a viable 
alternative to the strict pursuing of an inflation-targeting regime which is currently under 
heavy criticism for being a rather strict monetary policy regime.  
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